

Modelling a Multi-Faction Conflict in Multi-Domain Operations

NMSG-197 Symposium on *Emerging and Disruptive Modelling and Simulation Technologies to Transform Future Defence Capabilities*

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MSG-186, Chris Rolfs, Cervus Defence


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The screenshot displays a Cisco Webex Meetings window. The top bar shows the meeting title "MSG-186 Team" and the time "50:38". The interface includes a menu bar with options like "File", "Edit", "Share", "View", "Audio & Video", "Participant", "Meeting", and "Help". The main area shows a grid of video feeds for 11 participants. The bottom bar contains controls for "Mute", "Stop video", "Share", and other functions. A sidebar on the right lists the participants with their names and country codes.

Participant	Country	Audio	Video
Bao CAN	Me	On	On
AUS Andrew Gill	AUS	On	Off
CHE - Alessio	CHE	On	Off
Chris Rolfs - UK	UK	On	Off
DEU Stephan Seichter	DEU	On	Off
Esa Lappi	FIN	On	Off
FIN - Bernt Akesson	FIN	On	Off
Lynne Serre	FR	On	Off
Maude Amyot-Bourgeois	CA	On	Off
Peter Hillmann, UniBw...	DE	On	Off

Introduction

Basic Lanchester Model

$$\dot{B} = -r R$$

$$\dot{R} = -b B$$

$\dot{f}(t) = \frac{df}{dt}$: Time derivative

$B(t)$: Blue strength at time t

$R(t)$: Red strength at time t

Parameters

$B_0 = B(t_0)$: Initial strength of Blue

$R_0 = R(t_0)$: Initial strength of Red

b : Blue weapon effectiveness on Red

r : Red weapon effectiveness on Blue

Victory condition for Blue:

$$\varphi = \left(\frac{B_0}{R_0}\right)^2 \cdot \frac{b}{r} > 1$$

Multi-Faction Model

Multi-Faction Lanchester Model

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{B} &= -r_b R \\ \dot{R} &= -b B - g G \\ \dot{G} &= -r'_g R\end{aligned}$$

$G(t)$: Green strength supporting Blue at time t

Additional Parameters

$G_0 = G(t_0)$: Initial strength of Green

g : Green weapon effectiveness on Red

$r'_g = r_g - \alpha$, where:



r_g : Red weapon effectiveness on Green

α : Rate of support by Green to Blue



Victory condition for Blue:

$$\varphi > 1 + \left(\frac{B_0}{R_0}\right)^2 \cdot \frac{g}{r_b} \left(\frac{r'_g}{r_b} - 2 \frac{G_0}{R_0}\right)$$

Multi-Faction Model



Multi-Faction Model



Multi-Domain Model

Information (Cyber) Domain[†]

Blue force composed of a peer-to-peer network of systems:

$$B(t) = B_1(t) + B_2(t) + B_3(t)$$

B_1 : Susceptible to cyber attacks

B_2 : Infected by cyber attacks

B_3 : Immune to cyber attacks

NOTE: Red, Green forces not affected

Implications

Cyber domain: 3 possible transitions:

$B_1 \rightarrow B_2$: Virus infection, rate β_V

$B_2 \rightarrow B_3$: Immunization, rate β_A

$B_1 \rightarrow B_3$: Immunization, rate β_A

Physical domain: infected systems B_2 are less effective:


$$b_{r,A} > b_{r,V}$$

[†]


H. C. Schramm, D. P. Gaver, *Lanchester for cyber: the mixed epidemic-combat model*, Wiley online library, 2013

Multi-Faction, Multi-Domain Model


- Conflict in physical/cyber domains
- Numerical solution required
- 13 parameters:
 $B_1(t_0), B_2(t_0), B_3(t_0), R(t_0), G(t_0),$
 $b_{r,A}, b_{r,V}, r_b, r_g, \alpha, g, \beta_V, \beta_A$
- Victory condition?
- Conditions for which cyber attacks play a relevant role?



Multi-Faction, Multi-Domain Model



Multi-Faction, Multi-Domain Model



Data Farming

- **Simulation:**

- Blue Win = $MFMDM(\alpha, b_{r,A}, b_{r,V}, \beta_A, g_r, B_{10}, B_{20}, B_{30}, G_0; r_b, r_g, \beta_V, R_0)$
- **Decision** parameters x 9, **Noise** parameters x 4
- Include **uncertainty**: $g_r \sim \Gamma(k_{g_r}, \theta_{g_r})$ with $k_{g_r} = x_1, \theta_{g_r} = x_2$ etc.
- Decision **factors** x **14**, Noise parameters x **7**

- **Data Farming:**

- Build a **decision factor meta-model** **robust to noise factors**
- **MOE**: $\text{Prob}(\text{Blue Win}) = y \approx f(x_1, \dots, x_{14}; n_1, \dots, n_7)$

- **Design of Experiment:**



- Depends on the analytical **objective** (see next)

First Analytical Objective

- When we fail, **why** do we fail? (understanding **cause** and **effect**):
 - $\text{Prob}(\text{Blue Win}) = y \approx f(x_1, \dots, x_{14}; n_1, \dots, n_7)$
 - 2nd Order $f()$: $\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_{12} x_1 x_2 + \beta_{11} x_1^2 + \beta_{22} x_2^2 + \dots$
 - **Main** effect (β_1), two-factor **interaction** (β_{12}), **curvature** (β_{22})
- **Design of Experiment:**
 - To fit meta-model: Nearly Orthogonal **Latin Hypercube (1003 runs)**
 - For Noise factors: OLH (**17** replications)
 - Both are **space-filling** designs
 - Total 17,051 experiments! (Data Farming)
 - US Naval Postgraduate School spreadsheets

Second Analytical Objective

- What is required to succeed? (identifying **optimal decisions**):
 - $\text{Prob}(\text{Blue Win}) = y \approx f(x_1, \dots, x_{14}; n_1, \dots, n_7)$
 - $(x_1^*, \dots, x_{14}^*) = \mathbf{d}^* = \text{argmax} \iiint f(x_1, \dots, x_{14} | n_1, \dots, n_7) \partial n_1 \dots \partial n_7$
- Design of Experiment:
 - Use 17,051 NOLH/OLH design, or ... **Sequential** experimental design?!
 - Initial batch design $\mathbf{d}_1, \dots, \mathbf{d}_n$ which yields y_1, \dots, y_n
 - Next design point: $\mathbf{d}_{n+1}^* = \text{argmax} EI\{f(\mathbf{d}_{n+1} | \mathbf{d}_1, \dots, \mathbf{d}_n, y_1, \dots, y_n)\}$



- Expected Improvement: balance between **exploitation** and **exploration**

Conclusion

Summary

- Probabilistic Lanchester model
- Multi-Faction (Blue, Red, Green)
- Multi-Domain (cyber infection and immunization)
- Derivation of victory conditions:
 - Analytical
 - Numerical

Future Work

- Enhanced Data Farming techniques:
 - Sequential experimental design
 - Automated Machine learning
- Societal domain (public opinion)
- Address high level questions:
 - When we fail, why do we fail?
 - What is required to succeed?



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